It is impossible to follow the 10 Standard Fire Orders and still fight the fire. How did this come about? What do we mean when we say, "We don't bend them, we don't break them"? In discussing these issues with fire managers, they say the orders pertain to each and every firefighter and not just to the crew superintendent or the crew collectively. Furthermore, firefighters are expected to follow all the orders all the time.

These "orders" are deceptive in that they seem to be basic actions firefighters can accomplish. It is only on closer inspection and considering them in light of what is behaviorally possible that it becomes apparent that none of them can be followed, as stated, let alone following them all simultaneously as management suggests.

Using the 10 Standard Fire Orders and the 18 Watchout Situations is SOP for wildland fire entrapment investigations for determining the causal factors (Mangan, 1995). Since no one can follow them, it is not surprising that investigations into fatalities and accidents show some or all were violated. This situation begs the question of what is really learned during the investigations.

Nevertheless, the FIRE ORDERS are very meaningful guidelines; but they should be reworded so they can be followed and then prioritized. What follows is a historical review and psychological analysis with suggested rewording and priority arrangement of the ten standard fire orders. What are called the Real Fire Orders are contrasted with suggested New Fire Orders to show where we are now and where we ought to go.

OVERVIEW.

The 10 Standard Fire Orders (the 10) were formed as a consequence of the 1957 Inaja Fire, where 11 firefighters lost their lives. A later task group challenged future firefighters to learn and faithfully follow their proposed 10 Standard Fire Orders as a means for preventing future fire line accidents and fatalities.

The reemphasis on the 10 after the Thirtymile and South Canyon Fire tragedies brings the ten standard firefighting orders back full cycle into the spotlight. Throughout the fire organization we have heard such things as "we don't bend them, we don't break them." It comes as a curious state of affairs that upon closer examination it is humanly impossible to follow the 10 as stated. Does this in turn have an undesirable effect? It most certainly does.

The 10 are related to the mindless concept of zero risk tolerance, namely that "no real estate is worth risking your life for." I say this is a mindless concept because, from the moment we are born, we come into a risky world with a finite probability of dying each day of our life and a certainty of dying in the long run. We cannot achieve zero risk, we can only minimize risk and to some extent control risk within certain boundary conditions. Zero risk firefighting means you stay home. And, to be sure, it is also risky staying home.

The 10 Standard Fire Orders, the 18 Watchout Situations, and Zero Risk Tolerance are management top-down rules designed more to protect management than the firefighters. If the 10 were designed to protect firefighters, they would be stated so that they could be followed, put in order of priority, and clearly identified as to which ones were never to be "bent or broken." Although this is management's obligation, to date management has been stagnant, most likely because such a restructuring of the 10 would make management mutually responsible. Then management would fully share blame with firefighters for future accidents and fatalities. Restructuring the 10 would lead to fewer accidents and fatalities.

Failure to understand that the 10 cannot be followed produces yet another undesirable effect. For some time now, the 10 and 18 have been mindlessly used when accidents and fatalities occurred to see if they were followed or not (Mangan, 1995). Since they cannot be followed in the first place, it's a sure thing they'll show up again and again as causal factors. Then, with the false — at least shaky — factors re-identified, investigation teams announce to the world that the accident causes have been found. And that if only firefighters would obey them, all would be well. Using the 10 and 18 is still SOP for wildland fire entrapment investigations (Sadler Fire, 1999) even though such methodology is considered archaic and much better methodologies exist (Munson, 2000).

Notice that by identifying something, management is now off the hook. Meanwhile, life goes on and unfortunately death does, too. Wildland fire has become and continues to be a non-learning organization.

A CLOSER LOOK.

In 1956, on the Inaja Fire, 11 firefighters perished. Amid lawsuits and the prevailing political climate in Southern California, Forest Service Chief Richard McArdle established a fire task force to reevaluate firefighting, fire research, training and protective clothing. This task group went on to produce the Ten Standard Firefighting Orders and also recommended starting the equipment research that led to fire shelters and flame-resistant clothing. The task force recommended that every person with fire control responsibility commit the 10 to memory. They recommended initial and followup training to ensure firefighters understood both why the orders are necessary and how they can be applied.

The line officer was then to observe the results of this training on the fire line and conduct on-the-job training where needed and identify weaknesses of the training program. The current and original Standard Fire Orders are:

In 1959, William Moore elaborated on how to train in the 10 original orders as follows:

"Followup:  This is the payoff step in training and in the application of the ten standard firefighting orders. You will recognize the orders as being a statement of fundamentals, which should be second nature to every man with fire suppression responsibilities. Enthusiastic application of these fundamentals is necessary if we are to fight fires effectively and safely. It is on the fireline that the line officer can observe the results of the training program. He can conduct on-the-job training in the application of the ten standard orders. And perhaps most important of all he can detect weaknesses that will point the way to future training programs. For example, frequent failures in the application of standard orders 8 and 9 might indicate a need for intensive foremanship training; failures in applying orders 1 and 3 could indicate a need for more fire behavior training; inadequate equipment to meet the requirements of order No. 7 could be a warning that the fire equipment cache needs a change."

Today the above advice is rarely followed. New firefighters are taught the 10 in classes and then are seldom asked to use them. To follow the original intent of the 10 involves actively using the 10 on fire assignments in an ongoing learning process promoted by the crew leaders.

COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND THE 10

Consciousness refers to where our awareness is centered moment by moment. Conscious awareness is the fundamental mental process and is the embodiment of intention and action. Consciousness is like a gate:  open to momentary object it resides upon and closed to all other objects. It follows that a very small percent of available information ever reaches our minds.

We are continuously conscious of either mental or physical objects, but can be conscious of only one object at any moment in time. Our brains process information sequentially (A+B+C) and not interactively (A*B*C).

With training, people are good at identifying how much of A, B, or C is present (estimating wind speed) but poor at combining multiple factors (wind speed, fuel moisture, and percent slope). Because of this we tend to favor one of the three factors and base decisions heavily on the level of that single factor. And people tend to favor different factors (of the A, B, or C) for their primary weighting, thus better group decisions.

In comparison, computers are great at handling interactions. Predictive accuracy increases when people identify the level of A, B, and C and let the computer combine the three elements and produce the decision. Needless to say we seldom use computers to make our decisions on the fireline. Further research shows that we can usually handle only seven bits of information at one time, i.e. Miller's "magic number: 7 + 2." This is the basis for the 7-digit phone numbers. Again, this is associating seven bits, not using them interactively.

Another feature of our brains' sensory processing capacity is that sensory information comes in an on/off flow. For example, with visual sensory stimuli there is a phenomenon called critical fusion frequency. Our brains take pictures at the rate of, say, 60 frames per second. Old movies ran at 50 frames per second so Charlie Chapman's movements were always choppy. Later, the motion picture industry sped movies up to 70 frames per second and now motion is "fused" and appears solid and continuous. The bottom line is that we miss a good percentage of available information and we experience discontinuous events as continuous; therefore what we experience is not a duplicate reality.

Although we can handle only one stimulus at a time, our brains can rapidly scan and sample visual, then auditory, then smell, and create the impression that we are simultaneously experiencing information from more than one of the senses. Our brain's scanning rate is limited, thus our information processing capacity is limited.

Through focused concentration we can pay attention to a single sense, but this focus also blocks information flow from the other senses. In actual practice, however, it is very difficult to attend to a single sense. Loss of one sense can heighten the others, since it no longer competes for attention.

Limited cognitive capacity constrains good decision-making. It follows that stress and talking to yourself interfere with focused awareness and clear thinking. Stress in all its forms (such as body, mental and environmental stress) also reduces clear thinking by occupying part of our limited cognitive capacity.

Consider the following list of potential stresses:

The net effect of internal dialog and stresses and other competing behaviors is that they lead to a "browning out" of our mental efforts. We are all aware of this "browning out" as we get drowsy, but fail to see its effects at other times and particularly under highrisk conditions.

As an example, consider driving a car. Most car accidents result from inattentive behaviors. Recent research shows that those who drive cars while using cellular phones, even hands-free models, have over four times as many car accidents as drivers who don't use cellular phones. This rate is almost up to the accident rate of drunk drivers, i.e. five times the normal rate (Safeco, 1999). And to be sure, some drunk drivers use cellular phones.

What is a Fire Order example? Look at order No. 5: "Obtain current information on fire status." The behavioral problem here is that as soon as you make any fire observation it becomes a static conceptual memory, and a moment later it is no longer current. A picky detail? Not when you consider how your mind processes information. We make decisions on the past remembered fire behavior (concepts) rather than the current fire behavior. Normally the direct perception of the actual fire behavior is short-circuited by the concept, which has only a fraction of the information of a direct perception (de Charms, 1998).

When you size up the fire, first there is a brief direct perception of the fire in which you attend to the surface features of the fire and you come away with something analogous to a photo of the fire. A prolonged direct perception would be analogous to a video of the fire. What you have in memory is a solid-feeling, non-changing version of the constantly changing fire. If you then talk to another firefighter about the fire, what you access in memory is your static photo, not the dynamic fire. What the receiver pays attention to is what you recall of your internal photo. What they come away with is a concept of your photo, not the fire. In effect, a concept of a concept, containing even less information about the fire than your "photo." You and the other firefighters now make decisions on your concepts rather than the actual fire. The bottom line is that you cannot follow the order.

Most of the time we are unaware of the conceptual substitution and the corresponding gaps in our perception. To make matters worse, once you begin to ignore the 10 your mind will attend to them less and less. This is essentially what Quentin Rhoades reported on the South Canyon Fire. Hours before the blowup, he looked at the 10 and noted they were violating all 10. He felt he perceived the situation incorrectly, so he went back to work. Here Rhoades is more alert than most firefighters, because this event did reach a conscious level and he was able and willing to report it later. But to blame the resulting fatalities on not following the 10 is simple minded — or more accurately mindless — because it fails to capture what actually happens in firefighters' minds on the fireline. In time the 10 will not even come into consciousness, and this process is automatic. To learn more about the underlying psychology, refer to Daniel Goleman's Vital Lies, Simple Truths and Karl Weick's Sensemaking in Organizations.

Now consider how managers use the 10. Whenever I hear a fire manager say we don't bend or break the 10, I issue them the challenge to identify which, if any, should never be broken. Their normal answer is all of them. But if I clarify, that the same Fire Order then becomes the basis for never engaging a fire and the basis for disengaging the fire if it can't be followed, they go strangely silent. To date I have not had a single Fire Order recommended by anyone for total compliance, once the clarification and added contingency are stated. Clearly, fire management wants and enjoys a system where they can seldom be held accountable. To the degree firefighters buy into the 10 as firm orders, they also unrealistically hold themselves to blame. What is needed by firefighters and managers is to develop new fire orders that take into account how your mind works under stressful, risky fireline conditions.

THE REAL FIRE ORDERS:

It is informative to come up with a list of the 10 that firefighters are actually following as they perform their duties. My suggested "real" fire orders are based on 14 years of firefighting, 22 years doing accident and fatality investigations, and discussions with current firefighters.

The Real Fire Orders:

1. Fight fire aggressively
2. Maximize overtime, keep other costs down
3. Promote self and crew image
4. Promote agency image
5. Commit to an action and stay with it even if adverse changes occur
6. Fight fire safely
7. Shut up and butt up
8. Don't say no
9. Red card ratings are more important than experience
10. Reporting safety infractions will adversely affect your career

To the degree that the above follows the behaviors that are actually reinforced, it suggests a large gap between where we are and where we ought to be. The orders above Safety on this list warn firefighters of pressures towards taking unintended risks.

SUGGESTED RESTRUCTURING OF THE 10:

Consider the following Orders or Actions arranged according to priority:

NEW TEN STANDARD FIRE ORDERS:

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

1. Mindfully attend to your current state of mind — to stay alert, keep calm, think clearly and act decisively.
2. Size up fire behavior, weather, topography and fuels. Use lookouts and obtain forecasts as needed.
3. Provide for safety by assessing relevant risk factors including escape routes, survival zones and safety zones.
4. Plan key actions based on your mental, fire behavior, and safety size-ups.

   TAKE ACTION

5. Communicate with others including adjoining forces using clear, standardized, systematic protocols.
6. Act decisively.

   RE-EVALUATE

7. When you stop noticing changes, WAKE UP, go back to number 1.
8. When you notice significant internal or external changes, go back to number 1. Degree of changes in situational size-up and actions should correspond to the degree of observed change.

   DISENGAGE

9. Disengage from the fire when you no longer feel alert or safe.

   ACCOUNTABILITY

10. Supervisors shall conduct on-the-job training in the application of the above orders to ensure their understanding and operational use.

Mindful attention comes first, because without it the others are diminished. The key here is to be mindful in the technical, psychological sense (Putnam, 2001). Mindful organizations should also be promoted, as recently discussed by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001). Actions 2-6 essentially reword the current 10 Orders. Re-evaluations, Actions 7 and 8, keep you resilient when your mental abilities start to "brown out," or when habitual responses interfere with present situational awareness. Action 9 addresses disengagement, which is a major short-coming of the current 10 Orders. Action 9 refers to both mental and physical feelings that warn you something is wrong.

Accountability is the final action and directs supervisors to make using the 10 an active process. For example, a crewmember can be asked after the pre-fire briefing to predict the upcoming fire behavior. During the shift the supervisor can ask for an update and what the crewmember is attending to and how it affects their earlier prediction. At the end of the shift the prediction accuracy can be assessed by the entire crew. Such a process sends a message to all the firefighters that their opinions and training do matter and it promotes learning individuals and learning organizations.

DISCUSSION:

In looking at the historical development of the 10 we see from the wording and explanation that they were to be learned and followed when they apply to the situation. They were not intended to be followed by every firefighter all the time. The dogmatic adherence to the 10 is not based on operational realities; rather, it appears to be a management shift that places most the blame for accidents and fatalities on firefighters.

The key to creating new fire orders that are meaningful is to determine how they are used under fireline conditions. Firefighters and fire managers should jointly agree to new fire orders, determine if they can be followed, and keep revising them until they can be followed. Firefighters should be held accountable for learning the 10. Supervisors should be held accountable for conducting on-the-job training and questioning of firefighters to ensure the orders are known, understood, and practiced on the fireline. When a supervisor detects firefighters who fail under their questioning, it is essential to determine the cause, i.e. poor training or poor attention, so that there is a feedback loop in the process. Then we become a learning organization (Senge, 1990). Firefighters and managers are then mutually responsible for operational use of the 10.

IN SUMMARY:

The original fire orders and their intended usage have changed detrimentally over time compared to their current usage. It is long overdue to overhaul the Fire Orders along the lines suggested. Firefighters and managers need to assess what behaviors are actually practiced to identify the current Real Fire Orders. Through annual training and OJT they should ensure the New Fire Orders taught are the ones followed on the fireline. The Real Fire Orders and suggested rewording of the New Fire Orders were presented as food for thought. Firefighters and fire managers should come together in a task group and reformulate the Fire Orders, in mutual agreement, to further fireline safety.

REFERENCES:

Weick, Karl E. and Sutcliffe, Kathleen M. Managing the Unexpected (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass) 2001.